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Aligning Cognitive Complexity Models: Bridging Development Across Educational
and Supervisory Contexts
Abstract
Cognitive complexity is a requisite skill for mental health professionals, as they routinely face complex,
ambiguous tasks such as working within an evidence based practice framework in ways that bridge
clients’ subjective experiences with relevant psychotherapeutic outcome research. Multiple models for
conceptualizing and promoting cognitive complexity development in educational and supervisory settings
have been articulated, and the similarities across these models is striking. The purpose of this article is
to: 1) introduce readers to King and Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement model of educational
development and 2) demonstrate the striking alignment between the Reflective Judgement model and
prominent developmental models of supervision, with the aim of providing a seamless framework that
spans educational and supervisory contexts.
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Cognitive complexity is a developmental framework for conceptualizing how knowledge
is acquired and applied. While multiple definitions of cognitive complexity exist (Castillo, 2018),
in its most basic form, cognitive complexity development encompasses a spectrum. On one
extreme of the spectrum, people: (a) view the world dichotomously, (b) rely on perceived experts
for guidance and information, and (c) assume that reality is objective, and beliefs are universal.
On the opposite end, people: (a) view the world relatively and (b) believe knowledge is attained
through inquiry, although inquiry is inherently viewed through one’s subjective lenses and thus
cannot be trusted completely (Granello, 2000; Kitchner & King, 1981). It is important that
educators and supervisors foster cognitive complexity development, as it is foundational to
counseling skills including: (a) recognizing and integrating diverse information into coherent client
conceptualizations, (b) developing culturally appropriate treatment plans, (c) awareness of one’s
biases and blind spots (d) empathizing with clients, and (e) effectively applying counseling skills
(Castillo, 2018; Granello, 2000; Welfare & Borders, 2010).
Thus, it is beneficial for counselor educators and supervisors to understand and promote
cognitive complexity development. Multiple supervision theories implicitly or explicitly describe
cognitive complexity development, beginning with Hogan’s (1964) seminal developmental model.
Hogan emphasized the importance of developmentally tailoring supervision and described four
distinct developmental levels. Level one supervisees rely entirely on methods learned through their
training program, while level four supervises create novel, personalized approaches to
psychotherapy that integrate parts of themselves with models learned in their training program.
Hogan’s (1964) model gave rise to additional supervision models that articulate a cognitive
complexity framework including: (a) Loganbill, Hardy, and Delworth’s (1982) Conceptual Model
of Supervision, (b) Stoltenberg’s (1981) Counselor Complexity Model, (c) Stoltenberg, McNeill,

and Delworth’s (1998) Integrative Developmental Model, (d) Stoltenberg and McNeill’s (2010)
articulation of the Integrative Developmental Model, and (e) Rønnestad and Skovholt’s (2003)
research based developmental phase model.
There are also theories describing cognitive complexity in the context of broader education
such as King and Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement model and Perry’s (1970) model of
Intellectual and Ethical Development. While differences in the number of stages exist between
cognitive development models, for decades theorists have articulated remarkably similar
trajectories, whereby one progresses from concrete thinking and reliance on authority figures to
abstract, integrated, and less stereotyped thinking with high awareness of self and others (Blocher,
1983; Granello, 2000). It is encouraging that multiple theorists present similar developmental
trajectories (Granello, 2000; Welfare & Borders, 2010), and the alignment across models serves
as a useful baseline that provides fertile ground for integration.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the alignment between King and Kitchener’s
(1994) Reflective Judgement model and prominent developmental models of supervision, as a step
toward developing a comprehensive developmental framework that counselor educators,
counseling supervisors, and researchers can use to foster and understand counselor development.
In doing so, counseling supervision models (i.e., Loganbill, Hardy, & Delworth, 1982; Rønnestad
& Skovholt, 2003; Stoltenberg & McNeill, 2010) are aligned under a model that is grounded in an
educational context (i.e., King & Kitchener, 1994). This alignment demonstrates how a single
coherent framework can be used to conceptualize and foster cognitive complexity development
seamlessly across educational and supervisory contexts. Thus, educators can use this model to
conceptualize students’ cognitive complexity development when designing curriculum, learning,

and supervision experiences. Aligning these four models also provides a comprehensive definition
of, and conceptual framework for, cognitive complexity development.
Cognitive Complexity Within Domains
Evidence suggests that cognitive complexity is likely specific to contextual domains. Thus,
a trainee may demonstrate relative thinking in some contexts and dichotomous thinking in other
contexts (King & Kitchener, 1994; Loganbill et al., 1982; Stoltenberg & McNeill, 2010; Welfare
& Borders, 2010). For example, a trainee who demonstrates high complexity when conceptualizing
a client’s depression in the context of retirement and later life career transitions might demonstrate
low complexity when conceptualizing a different client’s depression in the context of interpersonal
struggles and attachment history. Thus, it is normal for supervisees to present with features from
multiple stages, based on the supervisee’s personal experiences, culture, values, biases, and beliefs.
Loganbill et al. (1982) explicitly focused on cognitive complexity development as domain
specific. These authors theorized that being in lower levels of cognitive complexity development
in some domains provides stability for supervisees who are experiencing turbulent cognitive
complexity development in other domains. Thus, readers are encouraged to consider trainee
development within specific contexts or domains, rather than considering trainees’ general
cognitive complexity development.
Aligning multiple conceptual models is congruent with cognitive complexity, as
integrative alignment is characteristic of higher levels of cognitive complexity development (e.g.,
Loganbill, Hardy, & Delworth, 1982; Stoltenberg & McNeill, 2010). However, in aligning
multiple models, one risks detracting from the wealth of contextual information that each unique
model provides. The purpose of this alignment is not to negate the unique contributions of each
model. To the contrary, aligning these models highlights the remarkable degree of consistency that

exists across cognitive complexity development models in educational and supervisory literature.
The Reflective Judgement Model
The following subsections are organized using the seven substages that King and Kitchener
(1994) described as an overarching framework. This framework is appropriate as it is rooted in
educational contexts and it has more substages, and thus specificity within substages, than the
supervision models. Using a framework that is grounded in education also bridges cognitive
complexity from existing supervision literature into broader educational and training contexts.
King and Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement model and measurement protocol have
been used in multiple research projects, including a ten-year longitudinal study in which the
authors catalogued the ways in which people at varying educational levels, from high school
through doctoral students, reflected on how they arrived at their responses to complex problems.
In developing their model, King and Kitchener integrated their own research with existing theories
(e.g., Perry, 1970) and research, which resulted in a cognitive complexity model with three stages
that are further divided into seven substages. Thus, King and Kitchener’s model is also a useful
step in transitioning developmental supervision models from being backed by faith (Storm, Todd,
Sprenkle, & Morgan, 2001) to being backed with empirical support. The following descriptions
are summarized based on King and Kitchener’s (1994) descriptions.
Pre-Reflective Thinking
This initial stage encompasses the first three substages of the model. During this stage,
people believe knowledge is absolute and certain. It is assumed that even the most complex
problems have answers that are objectively either correct or incorrect. The answers to problems
likely come either from authority figures or direct personal experience. These stages are

characterized by low awareness of others, as a person in these stages often assumes that others
share their exact beliefs.
Quasi-Reflective Thinking
The fourth and fifth substages fall under the second stage of King and Kitchener’s (1994)
model. Called the quasi-reflective thinking stage, this stage is marked by the recognition that
evidence is foundational to opinions, although people in this stage conceptualize knowledge as
highly subjective. Unlike those in the pre-reflective stage, people in the quasi-reflective stage
recognize that opposing views or contradicting facts exist. However, people in the quasi-reflective
stage are prone toward frustration, as they have difficulty reconciling opposing views or facts, and
they tend to see opposing views as carrying equal validity or weight. Thus, they believe that all
knowledge is inherently relative, and that there can never be any one correct answer.
Reflective Thinking
The final stage in King and Kitchener’s (1994) model, called the reflective thinking stage,
includes the sixth and seventh substages. People in this stage are better able to evaluate and apply
information to specific contexts to determine which opposing fact, believe, or evidence is likely to
be a better fit within a given context. In this way, people in the reflective thinking stage are no
longer impaired by the belief that knowledge is inherently relative. People in the reflective thinking
stage are highly self-aware, and they can clearly articulate the origins of their beliefs, and the extent
to which a given belief is empirically grounded. Simultaneously, they are also highly aware of
others, and they recognize that empirical evidence is inherently biased by subjectivity, and they
are aware that different peoples’ subjective world views can result in different conclusions.

Aligning Reflective Judgement with Developmental Supervision Models
The following sections describe the alignment between: (a) the seven substages in King
and Kitchener’s (1994) Reflective Judgement model, (b) the six phases in Rønnestad and
Skovholt’s (2003) supervisee development model, (c) the three stages in Loganbill, Hardy, and
Delworth’s (1982) Conceptual Model of Supervision, and (d) the three levels in Stoltenberg and
McNeill’s (2010) Integrative Developmental Model. Table 1 summarizes how stages in a given
model align with stages in the other models.
Pre-Reflective Thinking
King and Kitchener (1994) categorized the first three stages in their model as pre-reflective
thinking substages. The authors described struggles with low awareness, dichotomous thinking,
and a high reliance on authority figures as characteristic of these initial stages. As Table 1 shows,

the pre-reflective substages are analogous to level one in Stoltenberg and McNeill’s (2010) model
and to the initial stagnation stage in Loganbill et al.’s (1982) model. Similarly, Rønnestad and
Skovholt’s (2003) lay helper and beginning student phases align with the first two substages in
King and Kitchner’s (1994) model.
People in the pre-reflective thinking substages struggle with (a) awareness that problems
exist for which there is not an absolute answer, (b) using logical reasoning, and (c) identifying data
that is at odds with personal assumptions (King & Kitchner, 1994). Thus, trainees in these
substages will likely struggle with identifying relevant client information, evaluating the
applicability of clinical knowledge, and integrating research with practice.
Pre-reflective thinking: Substage one. The first pre-reflective substage is characterized
by the belief that knowledge is not abstract, and that it only exists in absolute, concrete terms.
People in this initial substage are prone to introjecting anything an authority figure states,
without critique or questioning, as people in this substage lack a framework for the idea that one
person might disagree with another (Kitchner & King, 1994). In their sample of people who were
high school aged and older, Kitchener and King (1981) did not identify anyone in substage one.
Thus, it is unlikely that students in graduate mental health programs are in this substage.
Further, educators likely look for factors that exclude people in the first substage during
the graduate admission process. For example, counselor educators often assess candidates for their
openness to multiple perspectives, ability to acknowledge and build upon the ideas of others, and
awareness of how personal values and biases have the potential to impact one’s worldview (Nagpal
& Ritchie, 2002; Swank & Smith-Adcock, 2014). These characteristics require awareness of self
and others, which is underdeveloped during the initial substages. In this respect, King and

Kitchener’s (1994) first substage is akin to Rønnestad and Skovholt’s (2003) lay helper phase, as
both occur before one enters a professional training program.
Pre-reflective thinking: Substage two. King and Kitchner (1994) described people in
their second substage as aware that alternative perspectives exist. However, people in this
substage maintain an absolute view of knowledge as either right or wrong. People in this
substage tend to view knowledge that is held by themselves or a trusted authority figure (e.g., a
priest, a news reporter, a teacher, or a supervisor) as representing an objective truth. In this way,
people in substage two acknowledge that different people have different opinions, even if
different opinions are dismissed as inaccurate, ignorant, or misinformed. A trainee in the second
substage might have a very basic template for what constitutes a mental health concern, such as a
list of diagnostic criteria, and they might rely on an authority figure for concrete advice on how
to alleviate clients’ symptoms.
The tendency for supervisees who are in early developmental stages to rely on educators,
supervisors, or other authority figures is consistent across multiple theories. Rønnestad and
Skovholt (2003) noted that supervisees in phase two of their model are likely to search for experts
to emulate, since their learning is largely based on mimicking perceived experts. Similarly,
Loganbill et al. (1982) conceptualized students in the beginning stagnation phase as having
dichotomous, constricted worldviews and being highly dependent on supervisors, to the point that
some supervisees believe their supervisors are all knowing. Supervisees in this stagnation phase
are unlikely to believe that knowledge comes from within themselves rather than from a perceived
expert. Stoltenberg and McNeill (2010) also proposed that supervisees in level one of their model
are likely dependent on their supervisor, and they recommend that supervisors accommodate this
dependence by providing structure and positive feedback, while generally avoiding direct

confrontation. Thus, educators and supervisors who encounter trainees in the second substage may
find it useful to focus on the relationship by offering genuine acknowledgement, validation, and
empathy, with the goal of encouraging the trainee to develop a more collaborative rather than
reliant relationship.
Pre-reflective thinking: Substage three. When people reach King and Kitchner’s (1994)
third substage, they begin to recognize that even authority figures are unable to answer some
questions. However, they persist in the belief that, given enough time and concrete evidence, a
single correct answer to the question will emerge. If someone in this substage encounters a
question that cannot be answered by an authority figure, they will often answer the question
based on what intuitively feels right. People in this substage eschew probability based on the
belief that evidence should point directly to a right or wrong answer. This quest for what is right
is reflected in Stoltenberg and McNeill’s (2010) description of level one supervisees as focused
on identifying the correct theoretical approach to treating a client.
Thus, trainees at this developmental level are aware that multiple experts have developed
multiple approaches, which may have efficacy with a client. However, these trainees are at risk for
mistakenly relying on their own values, biases, and beliefs when deciding among treatment options
that are not clearly differentiated by what they determine to be objective proof. In other words,
while generally well intentioned in their efforts, they are likely to blindly impose their worldviews
on clients (Bullough, Young, Hall, Draper, & Smith, 2008).
Educators and supervisors can prepare for trainees’ frustration when trainees are unable to
clearly determine which approach is ‘right’ for a given client or scenario. When this occurs, it may
be helpful to re-focus on the supervisory relationship and model process comments and reflections
to assist supervisees in becoming more aware of personal reactions, dynamics, and themes that get

in the way of assessing the myriad of potentially beneficial routes to understanding client concerns
(Eubanks-Carter, Muran, & Safran, 2015). Similarly, focusing on validation and positive feedback
can go a long way in easing anxiety and facilitating reflectivity (Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003)
The search for the right answer can place these trainees at risk for prematurely anchoring
to a given approach, without realizing that incomplete client information limits their identified
solutions. Students at this developmental level may be more likely to adhere to their primary
counseling theories, such as structured and empirically supported approaches like Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy (CBT), and they may lack the relative thought to recognize situations where
CBT may not be equally effective for all clients and presenting concerns. Rønnestad and Skovholt
(2003) suggested supervisors support supervisees in this developmental challenge (phase two of
their model) by providing concrete, easy to learn approaches to client care. On the other end of the
spectrum, more developed counselors are less reliant on their primary theoretical orientation, and
they are more likely to try out new clinical solutions. In other words, there is a positive relationship
between development and propensity toward using eclectic approaches (Brabeck & Welfel, 1985;
Vasco & Dryden, 1994).
Similarly, trainees in substage three are unlikely to adapt when faced with novel
information or contexts. These trainees may have difficulty relating complex factors to one
another, which can result in difficulty identifying the etiology of a given client’s mental health
concern. This difficulty may be related to the way that concrete representations are coordinated to
form a simple representational system during pre-reflective stages of development (King &
Kitchener, 1994).
For example, a supervisee may recognize that a client is experiencing a set of symptoms
(first concrete representation) which are consistent with depression (second concrete

representation) and they may also identify that the client’s depression emerged while the client
experienced the loss of a job (forming a simple representational system related to the etiology of
the client’s depression). However, such a reductionistic explanation may lead the supervisee to
focus on equally reductionistic solutions (e.g., behavioral interventions aimed at increasing
likelihood of future employment), while failing to address contextual factors such as how the
client’s culture, family expectations, relationship dynamics, and developmental life stage intersect
and exacerbate depressive symptoms. Thus, supervisors and educators working with trainees at
this developmental level can focus on exploring alternate contexts and encouraging supervisees to
develop contextual conceptualizations, which counter reductionistic thought patterns. Loganbill et
al. (1982) observed that supervisees who are nearing the end of the stagnation stage tend to take
comfort in dichotomous, concrete thought, which can result in the supervisee becoming stuck.
Thus, interventions that counter reductionistic thought patterns may be a critical bridge to the next
developmental substage.
Quasi-Reflective Thinking
King and Kitchener (1994) described people in the quasi-reflective thinking stage as
moving beyond relying on authority figures and personal experiences when forming their beliefs
and opinions. Rather, people in the quasi-reflective stage view knowledge as relative, and they are
thus aware that different people likely hold unique beliefs. As is seen in Table 1, King and
Kitchener’s descriptions of this stage align with Loganbill et al.’s (1982) confusion stage,
Stoltenberg and McNeill’s (2010) descriptions of level two supervisees, and Rønnestad and
Skovholt’s (2003) advanced student phase.

Quasi-reflective thinking: Substage four. In substage four of King and Kitchener’s
(1994) model, people begin to view knowledge abstractly, and they believe that it is not possible
to know anything with certainty. Trainees in stage four are likely to have difficulty
distinguishing theory from empirical evidence, and they are also likely to encounter difficulty in
evaluating differences in opinions. For example, if an educator expresses a different opinion
from a student in stage four, the student might acknowledge that different opinions exist, while
also asserting that neither position is more correct than the other. This could lead to frustration
and confusion within the counseling and supervision process. At the same time, multicultural
competence appears to emerge during this stage, as supervisees can conceptualize culture and
context as factors that underlie divergent opinions.
Rønnestad and Skovholt’s (2003) advanced student stage overlaps with King and
Kitchener’s (1994) fourth substage. Rønnestad and Skovholt described supervisees in the
advanced student stage as reliant on their supervisors, yet prone to ambivalence due to their
struggling to reconcile their dependence with a desire for autonomy. As trainees in this stage are
likely nearing the end of their training programs, they are learning how to focus internally, while
still relying on expert modeling.
Similarly, Stoltenberg and McNeill (2010) described supervisees as reaching level two of
their model after multiple semesters of practicum. These level two supervisees are more aware of
and empathetic toward clients, as they understand that one’s worldview and values are based on
lived experiences, context, and culture. They are aware that multiple perspectives exist, although
they may tend toward enmeshment within the counseling relationship. They are also prone to
alternate between autonomy and dependency, which can result in conflict with supervisors.

Loganbill et al. (1982) described supervisees who are in the confusion stage of their model
similarly, as they conceptualized these supervisees as confused, ambivalent, and, at times,
potentially hostile, due to their struggles with autonomy and dependence. Therefore, supervisors
working with trainees in this stage can model immediacy and self-disclosure to attend to the
relational dynamics and struggle for autonomy that present during this substage. Immediacy may
help to shift the focus to the supervisory relationship, while simultaneously highlighting
discrepancies between the supervisee’s words, behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. Similarly, selfdisclosure can strengthen the supervisory alliance, encourage autonomy, and provide alternate
conceptualizations of the client’s concerns based on multiple theoretical orientations (Friedlander,
2015).
Quasi-reflective thinking: Substage five. When a trainee enters King and Kitchener’s
(1994) fifth substage, they begin aligning with relative, rather than concrete or dichotomous, belief
systems. These trainees still believe that no one can know with certainty, however, they understand
that context and other factors can be used to evaluate the quality or strength of a belief system. In
this substage, one can evaluate two abstract concepts against one another to determine the relative
strength of knowledge claims. Doing so requires knowledge that alternate perspectives exist, and
that gaps exist in the evidence regarding which perspective is relevant to a specific client. Thus,
trainees in substage five can make contextually aware judgements and decisions, without relying
on dogmatic and reductionistic frameworks that are present in earlier stages (King & Kitchener,
1994). Loganbill et al. (1982) described this process of moving from concrete to relative thought
as liberating supervisees from restricted views of the self and the broader world.
Rønnestad and Skovholt (2003) captured supervisees’ move away from dogmatic
frameworks in their description of the novice professional stage. In this stage, supervisees

recognize more of the complexities of counseling, while also demonstrating awareness of how
their personality comes through in their work. However, supervisees in this stage may continue to
experience frustration, as they recognize that their education did not prepare them for all the client
complexities they are encountering. Stoltenberg and McNeill (2010) encouraged supervisors
working with trainees experiencing the turbulence associated with this developmental stage to
dynamically alter their supervision approach, based on the supervisee’s rapidly evolving needs.
When working with trainees in this stage, educators can provide opportunities to develop trainee
autonomy by encouraging trainees to watch and evaluate their recorded sessions and reflect on
tangible outcomes and goals for their ongoing development (Owen & Lindley, 2010).
Reflective Thinking
King and Kitchener (1994) referred to substages six and seven in their model as the
reflective thinking stages, as people in these substages view knowledge as constructed, rather than
as an objective truth. Inherent in this constructivist belief system is the notion that one cannot
separate knowledge from the context in which it was constructed. A clinician or supervisor who is
in these substages effectively draws on empirical evidence to evaluate different theories,
interventions, and other aspects of treatment, without becoming overly reliant on a given approach.
This way of thinking is arguably foundational to effective evidence based practice, as evidence
based practice requires clinicians to integrate their own clinical judgement with research support
(Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996). In this way, evidence based
practice is co-constructed by client, clinician, researcher, and supervisor. Thus, clinicians in the
reflective thinking stages are equipped to respond to Paul’s (1967) question by evaluating what
research is likely relevant to a unique client, with unique circumstances, who is working with a
particular clinician.

Reflective thinking: Substage six. Within King and Kitchener’s (1994) reflective
thinking stage, the sixth substage is denoted by a shift in the role that one takes in relation to
knowledge, as people in stage six recognize that they are an active part of the knowing process.
In this way, people stop taking the role of a passive knowledge spectator. Substage six thinkers
are actively engaged in constructing knowledge and recognize their engagement. Unlike substage
five thinkers, those in substage six eschew notions of right or wrong, as they prefer the more
relative terms better or worse.
This increased awareness regarding one’s role in the co-creation of knowledge is well
articulated by Rønnestad and Skovholt’s (2003) description of clinicians who are in the
experienced professional phase. Clinicians in this phase actively seek out continuing education,
work environments, and counseling approaches that are congruent with their own self-perceptions.
The increased self-awareness that accompanies this developmental level is beneficial to clinicians,
as it heightens awareness regarding their personal role in the counseling process, which translates
to better boundaries with clients. Thus, these clinicians are less likely to feel personally responsible
for client successes or setbacks.
Loganbill et al. (1982) provided similar descriptions for clinicians who are in the
integration stage. They described these clinicians as having realistic views of the self that remain
relatively stable. The authors indicated that clinicians in this stage are unlikely to become
frightened or to feel guilt when they are confronted with areas that are weaker or less developed,
since these clinicians are confident in their ability to grow and develop across multiple domains.
Despite having a stable self-concept, these clinicians remain open to growth and development, and
can dynamically adjust their values based on novel experiences and relationships.

Stoltenberg and McNeill (2010) articulated remarkably similar descriptions of clinicians
who reach level three in their model. Again, these clinicians experience elevated self-awareness
and self-confidence, and they value using the self as a therapeutic tool. This self-awareness results
in a highly personalized approach with clients. While these clinicians have occasional doubts about
their effectiveness, self-doubt is no longer debilitating. Supervisees at this level effectively use
supervision time, and focus supervision on clients, while also monitoring and integrating their own
personal reactions.
In addition to describing experienced clinicians as having high self-awareness and clear
boundaries, Rønnestad and Skovholt (2003) also described experienced clinicians as actively
embracing knowledge as relative. These clinicians are less likely to mechanically apply
techniques, as they develop a profound awareness that there are not clear answers to the challenges
they encounter in their work with clients. Theories and empirical evidence are also seen as relative,
and they are not blindly applied to clients. Thus, experienced clinicians can effectively incorporate
their personal and professional identities, set boundaries, learn from personal and client
experience, and tailor treatment to each client’s unique needs.
Supervisors working with substage six supervisees can provide space for supervisees to
explore their personal experiences and awareness in the context of their work with clients.
Similarly, exploring nuanced, contextual dynamics that present in counseling sessions may provide
these supervisees with a framework to increase the amount of information that they synthesize
when conceptualizing clients and the overall counseling process. Supervisors can also support
supervisees in integrating large amounts of conceptual information – ranging from empirical
evidence to self of the counselor – in the context of within and across session themes. While it is
unlikely that clinicians at this stage will engage in formal supervision, additional development can

be fostered through collaborative peer relationships and peer consultation that is sought out in
response to a specific need or limitation.
Reflective thinking: Substage seven. The seventh and highest substage in King and
Kitchener’s (1994) model involves synthesizing large amounts of information from diverse
sources into coherent explanations for abstract problems. Explanations for problems are not
considered set in stone, rather they are malleable when faced with novel evidence, information,
or contexts. Clinicians and supervisors in stage seven actively critique working hypotheses, for
example, client conceptualizations and treatment plans, as they are perpetually integrating
additional information. Loganbill et al. (1982) described supervisees in the highest stage of their
model as having the calm flexibility they need to continuously adjust to novel circumstances. In
this way, stage seven thinkers embrace the notion that they can never know with complete
certainty, while synthesizing information to evaluate the likelihood of multiple conclusions or
solutions. These thinkers can differentiate between a broad range of potential contexts, while
also integrating information from multiple contexts.
As this stage requires a high level of integration across multiple professional domains, it is
analogous to Stoltenberg and McNeill’s (2010) description of clinicians who reach level three
integrated (3i). To reach this developmental level, a clinician must meet their description for level
three across many domains that are relevant for work with clients including ethics, interpersonal
differences, assessing, goal setting, theoretical orientation, conceptualizing, treatment planning,
and intervening.
Rønnestad and Skovolt (2003) described what is arguably the highest developmental level.
While they term this phase the senior professional phase, much of their description emphasized

developmental markers that are common in later life regardless of one’s profession. These include
coping with the aging process, existential concerns, and generativity.
Given the height of this developmental level, supervisory relationships are inherently peer
to peer, rather than hierarchical. Conversations may emphasize later life development, including
existential struggles and opportunities to give back to the profession and novice clinicians as well
as critically exploring novel information in the context of existing, yet dynamic theories, models,
or approaches. Critically challenging one another may enable these clinicians to continue
integrating information across contextual domains.
Implications for Counselor Training & Preparation
The developmental theories in this article provide congruent implications that counselor
training programs can use to conceptualize and support student development in order to adequately
prepare counselors in training for clinical practice and supervision. These implications include
constructing recursive learning experiences that support students’ developmental trajectories
across multiple intersecting domains. Using a recursive approach to build and structure content
provides students with multiple opportunities to conceptualize content as they progress through
developmental stages.
Taken together, the theories discussed in this article outline a clear developmental
trajectory. Students who are in early developmental stages: (a) rely on external authority figures,
(b) think dualistically, and (c) have low awareness of self and others. Conversely, higher
developmental levels are identified by: (a) a balanced perspective of one’s personal strengths and
limitations, (b) complex thinking that includes diverse perspectives, and (c) high awareness of
oneself and others (King & Kitchener, 1994; Loganbill et al., 1982; Rønnestad & Skovholt, 2003;
Stoltenberg & McNeill, 2010). Counselor educators can use intentional program and course design

to build a curriculum that encourages students to develop within and across courses and achieve a
baseline level of competency prior to practicum and internship experiences.
Educators who are designing counseling programs can account for student development by
structuring content in courses as well as the sequence in which students take courses in ways that
build awareness, decrease dependence on experts, and present information across multiple
contexts. For example, many counseling programs are designed with courses that target each of
the eight CACREP (2016) Professional Identity standards. Such a program may have one class
that meets many of the Career Development standards, one class that meets the Social and Cultural
Diversity standards, one class that meets the Research and Program Evaluation standards, and so
forth. While this design is sensible in the context of accreditation standards, program evaluation,
and student evaluation, it may not be ideal for encouraging students’ cognitive complexity
development, as it does not account for content building and integrating across courses or for
students being exposed to divergent experiences, ideas, and theories.
Through intentional course and curricular design that begins with a clear vision of the
desired results (i.e., Wiggins & McTighe, 1998; Wiggins & McTighe, 2012), a program that is set
up using the one class per content area design can provide students opportunities to develop within
a given course. For example, students in the training program in which the first author teaches are
required to take a theories class early in the program. As the class happens early in the program, it
is assumed that most students in the course are at lower developmental levels. While designing the
class, the teacher can begin by identifying developmental outcomes as well as accreditation
standards that must be met in the course. The teacher can then design and structure course content
and activities so that students are given multiple opportunities to build self-awareness. For
example, the second author requires students to observe recorded counseling sessions and identify

their personal reactions to each theory. Similarly, the second author also structures content to
decrease reliance on expert opinions by sequencing assignments so students can compare different
theorists and reflect on how a given theorist’s ways of understanding client struggles might limit
the applicability of a given theory for a specific client. In this example, students are presented with
experiences that are intentionally designed around the outcome of reducing their reliance on
experts, which defines King and Kitchener’s (1994) first and second substages, thereby moving
them toward the third substage. Thus, by using these backward course design approaches (i.e.,
Wiggins & McTighe, 1998; Wiggins & McTighe, 2012), instructors can intentionally design
courses with the explicit objective of promoting cognitive complexity development.
Additionally, students’ cognitive complexity development can be furthered by identifying
developmental outcomes across courses. For example, the semester after they take their theories
course, students might be required to take a diversity course. The diversity course can build on
students’ cognitive complexity development in the theories course by recursively cycling through
the theories they used, while giving students opportunities to review what they learned in the
theories course in the context of how the theories apply to culturally diverse clients. Applying
content learned in one class to novel situations and contexts is congruent with movement from
King and Kitchener’s (1994) fourth substage, in which one begins viewing knowledge as abstract,
to their fifth substage, in which one is can relate abstract concepts to one another.
Likewise, a research course might also build on a theories course by teaching students to
evaluate empirically supported theories and evidence-based practices. This approach also provides
students with opportunities to develop knowledge and skills in a single contextual domain, in this
case a theories class, before they are asked to connect cultural and research domains to what they
have learned. Like above, connecting multiple abstract domains requires one to achieve relative

thought, which aligns with King and Kitchener’s (1994) fifth substage. Supervisors and educators
wishing to take such an approach may benefit from further exploration of frameworks and
techniques for fostering trainees’ cognitive complexity development, such as Kindsvatter and
Desmond’s (2013) problem-based approach. They might also consider implementing instruments
for measuring cognitive complexity (i.e., Welfare, 2006) across students’ programs and clinical
experiences.
Conclusion
Aligning developmental supervision models with King and Kitchener’s (1994) stages
bridges the conceptual gap between counselor education and counselor supervision. This
alignment also provides counselor educators with a framework for including cognitive complexity
development in course and curriculum design, as well as supervised clinical work. In this way,
students’ development can be conceptualized continuously from the time they begin training
through supervised practice required for professional licensure.
Cognitive complexity development is an area that merits additional research. For example,
research identifying factors that facilitate cognitive complexity development is needed (Welfare
& Borders, 2010). Similarly, there is a need for empirically validated cognitive complexity scales,
and research regarding the relationship between counselor cognitive complexity development and
client outcomes is scant. Despite the need for additional research, the convergence of multiple
theoretical perspectives across multiple decades speaks to the ongoing importance of
conceptualizing counselors’ cognitive complexity development. Further integrating these models
into counselor training programs has the potential to bolster students’ competence and preparation
for clinical work.
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